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effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." ' 13 To demonstrate the need for the rule promulgated by the Court in Miranda, ChiefJustice Warren began by examining the recent history of the methods employed by the police in interrogations.1 4 The Chief Justice described the progression from physical coercion, which had been the norm into the twentieth century, to the modem use of psychological tricks to obtain confessions.' 5 The Chief Justice followed this analysis with a brief look at the privilege against self-incrimination, a privilege which originated in ancient times and developed into a principle of law defining "the proper scope of governmental power over a citizen."' 16 In view of the longstanding existence of the privilege against self-incrimination as a principle of law and the threat posed to it by the "inherently compelling pressures"'1 7 of custodial interrogation, the Court was determined in Miranda to. restrict the actions of police interrogators. 18 The Miranda restrictions took the form of a requirement that all subjects of custodial questioning must be advised of their rights prior to any interrogation by the police. 19 The Court enumerated those rights as the right to remain silent and the right to have counsel present at any interrogation. 20 The Court based its requirement that subjects be informed of their right to counsel on the coercive nature of custodial interrogation, observing that such pressure might induce a subject to forego the privilege against self-incrimination, were that privilege supported only by the right to silence. 2 ' Informing subjects of their right to counsel and allowing them recourse to such, the Court rea-'3 Id. 14 The ChiefJustice wrote that "an understanding of the nature and depth of this incustody interrogation is essential to our discussion today." Id. at 445.
15 The ChiefJustice pointed to studies conducted in the 1930's which verified the use of physical coercion to extract confessions. Id. at 445-46. The ChiefJustice noted that such activity had continued into the 1960's, albeit with less frequency. Id. at 446. Chief Justice Warren then turned his attention to the more modern practice of psychological coercion, noting the use of manuals detailing effective questioning techniques, and their emphasis on privacy, presumption of guilt, perseverance and trickery. Id. 16 Id. at 460. 17 Id. at 467.
18
Id. 19 Id. 20 Id. at 467-469. As a corollary to the right to remain silent, the Court required that all subjects must receive a specific warning that should they choose to forego that right, anything which they might say could later be used against them in court. Id. at 469. 21 Id. The sixth amendment states that "[iun all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right.., to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST.
AMEND. VI.
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[Vol. 79 INTERROGATIONS soned, would serve to better protect their fifth amendment right. 2 2 The Court found added benefit in the possibility that the presence of a subject's lawyer might discourage attempts by the authorities to coerce a confession. 23 To grant subjects the fullest opportunity to assert the right to counsel, the Court declined to limit the effectiveness of such requests to the pre-interrogation period, 2 4 and emphasized that subjects must specifically waive their right rather than simply fail to assert it. 25 The Court sought to ensure that all subjects should enjoy the right to counsel by requiring that subjects unable to secure or afford the services of an attorney would receive the benefit of counsel at government expense. 26 The Court then underscored its position on the requirement that authorities must inform subjects of their right to counsel by noting that "[i]f the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney, and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel."
Miranda created a system of warnings which police must provide to custodial subjects prior to any questioning. 28 These warnings are commonly referred to as Miranda rights. 29 Chief Justice Warren's summary of the holding of Miranda incorporated the traditional phrasing of Miranda rights. He stated:
We hold that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, then the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege, and unless other fully effective means are adopted to notify the person of his right to silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored, the following measures are required. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed to him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to 22 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469-70. 23 Id. at 470. 24 Id. 25 Id.
26 Id. at 472-73. 27 Id. at 475. 28 Id. at 478-79. 29 Id.
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answer questions or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
3 0
Although somewhat controversial at the time of its adoption by the Court, 3 ' the Miranda decision created a framework for interrogations which remains substantially unchanged today. Since the Miranda rule was established, the Court has on numerous occasions considered Miranda's language and its applicability to diverse situations.
The Court has generally read the language of Miranda narrowly, occasionally restricting significant terms to very precise meanings. In Fare v. Michael C. ,32 the Court defined "counsel" to refer specifically to an attorney.
3 3 Similarly, in Rhode Island v. Innis, 34 the Court defined "interrogation" precisely as refering "not only to express questioning but also to any words on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the subject." 35 In Oregon v. Bradshaw 3 6 the Court declined to 30 
Id. (citations omitted).
31 The ChiefJustice addressed some of the anticipated criticism within the opinion.
The Chief Justice rejected the idea that society's need for effective interrogation outweighs the individual privilege against self-incrimination, stating that, "[t]hat right cannot be abridged." Id. at 479. To support the assertion that the rule of Miranda would not unduly hinder police procedure, ChiefJustice Warren pointed to the F.B.I.'s traditional use of warnings similar to those enunciated in Miranda, and that organization's "exemplary record of effective law enforcement." Id. at 483. 32 442 U.S. 707 (1979) . Fare concerned a juvenile's request to see his probation officer rather than an attorney. The request was denied and the juvenile confessed to the charge of murder during the interrogation. Id. at 711. The Court rejected thejuvenile's petition that his confession be suppressed because a request to see one's probation officer does not constitute an assertion of the right to an attorney. Id. at 727-28. 33 Id. at 719. The Court noted that the right to counsel rule in Miranda was based on "this Court's perception that the lawyer occupies a critical position in our legal system because of his unique ability to protect the Fifth Amendment rights of a client undergoing custodial interrogation." Id.
34 446 U.S. 291 (1980). In Innis a man arrested for murder asserted his right to counsel but then told police where to find the murder weapon while in transport to the police station. Id. at 294-95. The subject revealed the whereabouts of the weapon in response to a conversation between the transporting officers who speculated on the consequences should a child find the weapon before the police did. Id. The Court declined to find that the conversation between the two policemen constituted "interrogation." Id. at 300-02.
35 Id. at 301. The Court further clarified its definition, stating that "[a] practice which the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation." Id.
36 462 U.S. 1039 (1983) . Bradshaw concerned a man who asked to speak to a lawyer, then initiated a conversation with a police officer as to how the police would proceed. Id. at 1042. The man subjected himself to a lie detector test at the officer's suggestion,
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INTERROGATIONS provide a precise definition of "initiation" of further conversation by the subject, 3 7 but did exclude remarks on the part of the subject "relating to routine incidents of the custodial relationship. ' " 3 8 Similarly, in Berhemer v. McCarty 3 9 the Court did not specifically define "custody" but did exclude situations involving detainment of a subject by the police which were not "police-dominated." 40 The Court's habit of interpreting the language of Miranda narrowly reflects the belief, as noted in Berkemer, that "[o]ne of the principle advantages of the doctrine that suspects must be given warnings before being interrogated while in custody is the clarity of that rnle." 4 1
While the Court has established a record of construing the language of Miranda narrowly, it has not developed a specific pattern in applying Miranda to diverse situations. Instead, the Court has generally focused on the specific issues in the individual cases in clarifying the Miranda doctrine. The Court has addressed the issue of a subject's valid waiver of his rights on several occasions. In Michigan v. Tucker 4 2 the Court held a waiver valid although the subject received only a partial set of warnings. 43 1974) . Tucker involved a man who was arrested for rape and confessed to the crime. The defense later sought to suppress a witness' testimony. Id. at 437. The prosecution learned of the witness from remarks made by the defendant, who had not received a full set of Miranda warnings because police had not informed him of the provision of counsel for the indigent. Id. at 438. The Court declined to suppress the witness' testimony, noting that the defendant's remarks had not been coerced; neither had they been admitted into evidence, tainting the actual trial. Id. at 449. 43 Id. In reaching its decision, the Court noted that "[j]ust as the law does not require that a defendant receive a perfect trial, only a fair one, it cannot realistically require that policemen investigating serious crimes make no errors whatsoever. . ..
Court considered a related situation, here holding valid a subject's partial waiver of rights. 4 5 The Court also considered three cases which involved the scope of the waiver of rights. In Wyrick v. Fields, 4 6 the Court held that a waiver of rights for the purpose of a polygraph exam might extend to conversation immediately following the exam. 4 7 Similarly, in Colorado v. Spring, 48 the Court held valid a waiver of rights even though interrogators included issues unknown to the subject prior to his waiver. 49 In Moran v. Burbine, 50 the Court upheld a waiver, rejecting a requirement that the police Before we penalize police error, therefore, we must consider whether the sanction serves a valid and useful purpose." Id. at 446. 44 479 U.S. 523 (1987) . In Barrett, a man arrested on suspicion of sexual assault agreed to speak without an attorney present but refused to sign anything. Id. at 525. The Court emphasized that the subject had "made clear to police his willingness to talk about the crime for which he was a suspect," and held that the oral statements need not be suppressed because the subject had made only a partial request for counsel. Id. at 527-29. 45 Id. The Court also rejected the suggestion that the partial waiver indicated an incomplete understanding of the consequences of a partial waiver on the part of the defendant. Id. at 530. 46 459 U.S. 42 (1982) . Wyrick concerned a man arrested for rape who requested a polygraph examination. Advised of his rights before the test, the man afterwards made incriminating remarks which he later sought to have suppressed. Id. at 44-45. Rejecting the man's argument, the Court held that the statements made after the test were admissible because the man had been made aware of his rights and had voluntarily waived them. Id. at 47. In particular, the Court noted that, "it would have been unreasonable for Fields and his attorneys to assume that Fields would not be informed of the polygraph results and asked to explain any unfavorable result." Id. 47 Id. The Court rejected any contrary ruling as illogical, noting that, "the questions put to Fields after the examination would not have caused him to forget the rights of which he had been advised and which he had understood moments before." Id. at 49. 48 479 U.S. 564 (1987) . Spring presented the case of a man arrested for illegal purchase of firearms. When the man waived his right to counsel the police questioned him not only about that crime but about a murder as well. Id. at 567. The man confessed to the murder but later moved to have the confession suppressed. Id. at 568. The Court declined to affirm the suppression order, noting that the man's confession was in no way coerced. Id. at 573-74. The Court further noted that, "there is no allegation that Spring failed to understand the basic privilege guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Nor is there any allegation that he mistook the consequences of speaking freely to the law enforcement officials." Id. at 575. 49 Id. at 574. The Court pointed out that "[t]he Constitution does not require that a criminal suspect know and understand every possible consequence of a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege." Id.
50 475 U.S. 412 (1986). Moran involved a man arrested for breaking and entering who was discovered to be wanted for murder in another city. The man submitted to questioning in both cases, unaware that his sister was trying to obtain counsel for him, and confessed to both crimes. Id. at 415. The Court declined to rule that the authorities had an obligation to inform the man of his sister's efforts, noting that "[e]vents occurring outside of the presence of the suspect and entirely unknown to him surely can have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right." Id. at 422.
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INTERROGATIONS 683 inform a subject of outsiders' efforts to obtain counsel for him. 5 ' Finally, in Smith v. Illinois, 5 2 the Court drew a distinction between the waiver and the invocation of Miranda rights, holding that a subject's post-waiver responses might be used to determine the validity of the waiver. 53 The Court has not limited its attention to the validity of waivers of rights, but has interpreted the applicability of the Miranda doctrine to other issues as well. In New York v. Quarles 54 the Court crafted an exception to the rule barring the admission of any evidence obtained from statements made by the subject, prior to being informed of his Miranda rights. 5 5 The Court held that the requirement might be dispensed with where public safety was concerned. Oregon v. Elstad 57 presented the Court with a somewhat similar situa-51 Id. The Court stated that "we have never read the Constitution to require that the police supply a suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate his self-interest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights." Id.
52 469 U.S. 91 (1984) . In Smith, a man arrested for armed robbery made a halting request to see a lawyer, which his interrogators chose to ignore. Id. at 92. The Court found the request to be unambiguous and ordered the confession suppressed. Id. The Court noted that "[t]he courts below were able to construe Smith's request for counsel as ambiguous' only by looking to Smith's subsequent responses to police questioning." Id. at 97 (emphasis in original). The Court critcized this type of analysis as "unprecedented and untenable." Id.
53 Id. at 100. The Court held that an accused's postrequest responses could not be used to cast doubt on the clarity of the assertion of rights, and that "[s]uch subsequent statements are relevant only to the distinct question of waiver." Id.
54 467 U.S. 649 (1984) . Quarks concerned a man apprehended by the police for rape and possession of a weapon. The subject answered a policeman's question as to the location of the weapon before being read his rights. Id. at 652. The Court held that such questioning was permissible in the interests of public safety, stating that "the need for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege against selfincrimination." Id. at 657.
55 Id. The Court acknowleded that the Quarles decision might lessen the clarity of the Miranda rule, but suggested that police officers "can and will distinguish almost instinctively between questions necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of the public and questions designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect." Id. at 658-659.
56 Id. The Court noted that, "we do not believe that the doctrinal underpinnings of Miranda require that it be applied in all its vigor to a situation in which police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety." Id. at 656. 57 470 U.S. 298 (1985) . Elstad presented the case of a man who was arrested in his home on charges of burglary. The man made an incriminating statement before police could advise him of his rights. Id. at 301. At the police station, he was read his rights and again confessed. Id. He later sought to have both confessions suppressed. Id. at 302. The Court declined to hold the second confession tainted, and rejected the defendant's contention that knowledge of the authorities' awareness of the first confession induced him to make the second at the station. Id. at 309. The Court held it an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that a simple failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other cicumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to excercise his free will, so taints the investiga-tion, involving a subject's voluntary confession prior to the administration of Miranda warnings, and the admissibility of statements taken after the subject had been read his rights. 5 8 Here the Court barred the pre-warning statements but admitted the evidence obtained after authorities had advised the subject of his rights. 59 In Michigan v. Mosley 6 0 the Court again considered a situation involving successive interrogations. But in Mosley, the interrogations involved separate cases and the subject received the proper warnings, asserting his right to silence in the first interrogation but waiving his rights in the second. 61 The Court declined to apply the assertion from the first case to the second, holding that the authorities had satisfied Miranda by observing the prescribed procedures. 62 These three cases suggest a willingness on the part of the Court to examine particular situations to determine whether a subject's Miranda rights have been accorded the proper respect.
The Court moved in a different direction in Edwards v. Arizona, 6 3 tory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period.
Id.
58 Id. at 300-03. The Court noted that " [t] hough Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made." Id. at 309. 59 Id. at 318. The Court further noted that, " [t] his Court has never held that the psychological impact of a voluntary disclosure of a guilty secret qualifies as state compulsion or compromises the voluntariness of a subsequent informed waiver." Id. at 312. 60 423 U.S. 96 (1975) . Mosley involved a man arrested for robbery who refused to answer questions when the police attempted to interrogate him. At a later time police questioned him about a murder and obtained a confession. Id. at 98. The Court refused to uphold a suppression order, stating that the police had legitimately re-initiated questioning on a separate matter after the passage of a significant period of time. Id. at 106-07. 61 Id. The Court noted that "[a] review of the circumstances leading to Mosley's confession reveals that his 'right to cut off questioning' was fully respected in this case." Id. at 104. 62 Id. The Court particularly emphasized the proper adherence to the Miranda rule on the part of the police, stating that:
[t]his is not a case, therefore, where the police failed to honor a decision of a person in custody to cut off questioning, either by refusing to discontinue the interrogation upon request or by persisting in repeated efforts to wear down his resistance or make him change his mind. In contrast to such practices, the police here immediately ceased the interrogation, resumed questioning only after the passage of a significant period of time and the provision of a fresh set of warnings, and restricted the second interrogation to a crime that had not been a subject of the earlier interrogation. Id. at 105-06.
63 451 U.S. 477 (1981) . In Edwards, a man arrested on charges of burglary, robbery and first-degree murder at first agreed to submit to questioning but soon thereafter asked to speak to an attorney. Id. at 478-79. The police terminated questioning at that point, but resumed it on the following day. Id. The subject, who had been warned by a guard that he must answer questions, confessed to the crimes. Id. The Court ruled that 684
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opting to further develop the restrictions placed on interrogators subsequent to a subject's request for counsel.6 4 Edwards involved multiple interrogations of a subject concerning one case, and the Court focused on the voluntariness of the subject's waiver of his rights, which followed an ungranted request to see an attorney.
65
The Court emphasized two points: first that any waiver of the right to counsel must be made not only voluntarily but knowingly and intelligently, 6 6 and second that an initial request for counsel creates a need for additional safeguards to protect the subject's privilege against self-incrimination. 67 The Court then established additional safeguards, holding that: when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation, even if he has been advised of his rights. We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversation with the police.
68
Thus, Edwards created a bar against further interrogation on a specific issue, subsequent to a request for counsel, unless the subject initiates further contact with the police himself. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the order and the Arizona Supreme Court denied the state's petition for review. 90 The United States Supreme Court subsequently granted the state's petition for writ of certiorari to determine whether Roberson's assertion of his right to counsel in the April 16 investigation should bar the police from approaching him on the April 15 case. 9 1 IV.
1988] 685
SUPREME COURT REVIEW Roberson concerned the application of an assertion of Miranda rights in one investigation to a subsequent interrogation in a separate in
SUMMARY OF THE OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Justice Stevens began the Court's opinion by characterizing the State of Arizona's petition to overturn the suppression order as a request that the Court craft an exception to the Edwards rule. 9 2 The Court stated that the state's exception would permit further policeinitiated interrogation subsequent to a request to speak to counsel, when the questioning involves a separate investigation. 93 The Edwards rule bars police-initiated interrogation following a request to speak to counsel, until the subject consults an attorney or initiates further questioning himself. 9 
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Stevens cited language from State v. Routhier, 9 5 a case similar to Roberson, in which the Arizona Supreme Court held that the Edwards rule applied to require suppression of a confession obtained after a subject's request to see a lawyer, regardless of the fact that the interrogation focused on an unrelated issue. 9 6 To demonstrate that the Routhier Court properly applied Edwards and permitted suppression of any statements elicited after a request for counsel, Justice Stevens pointed to the Court's expressed desire in Miranda, to provide "concrete constitutional guidelines for courts to follow." 9 7 Noting that the Court has often reiterated the virtue of Miranda's "ease and clarity of ... application," 98 Justice Stevens explained that the Edwards rule acts as a corollary to Miranda. 9 9 Both rules seek to to mitigate the coercive nature of custodial interrogation to enable a subject to freely determine whether to answer questions put to him by the authorities.1 0 0 According to Justice Stevens, the restrictions on interrogation procedures set forth in Miranda and Edwards provide a bright line rule on custodial questioning, the virtue of which the Court has repeatedly stressed.1 0 1 The majority opinion concluded that a rule barring 95 137 Ariz. 90, 669 P.2d 68 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984). Routhier concerned a man arrested on charges of murder and attempted murder. When taken into custody, the man at first agreed to answer questions but then asked for legal counsel. Id. at 71-72. Three days after his request, before he had seen a lawyer, an officer approached the man and questioned him regarding an unrelated homicide. Id. In the course of this interrogation, to which the man had voluntarily submitted, the man confessed to the charges in the first homicide. Id. at 92, 669 P.2d at 71-72.
Justice Stevens analogized Routhier to Roberson, citing Routhier for the proposition that, "[t]he only difference between Edwards and the appellant is that Edwards was questioned about the same offense after a request for counsel while the appellant was reinterrogated about an unrelated offense. We do not believe that this factual distinction holds any legal significance for fifth amendment purposes. 101 Id. at 2098. Justice Stevens cited several cases in which the Court acknowledged the "bright-line" rule established in Edwards. In Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), the Court noted that it had "freqeuntly emphasized that "one of the characteristics of Edwards is its clear, 'bright-line' quality." Id. at 634. Jackson, a sixth amendment case, involved two men who were interrogated before they had an opportunity to consult with their appointed counsel. The Court suppressed the confesssions in that case. INTERROGATIONS all police-initiated interrogation, following a subject's assertion of his right to counsel, properly followed from the Court's intention that rules on interrogation procedures should be unambiguous.' 0 2
Justice Stevens dismissed the state's argument that the Edwards rule should not apply to situations in which the subject's request for counsel arose in a separate investigation.1 0 3 The majority rejected the state's attempts to prove their argument based on previous case law, and to distinguish the factual situation of Roberson from that of Edwards.' 0 4 Dismissing the state's assertion that several cases other than Edwards controlled in Roberson, Justice Stevens accorded considerable weight to the presumption that a subject's request for counsel indicates the subject's doubt in his ability to answer questions on any matter without the assistance of an attorney.' 0 5 Addressing the Court's holding in Michigan v. Mosley 10 6 that the authorities might re-initiate questioning on an unrelated issue after a significant period of time, 10 7 Justice Stevens noted that that case involved the right to silence, not the right to counsel.1 0 8 Justice Stevens suggested that the importance of the distinction between Mosley and Roberson lay in the fact that "a subject's decision to cut off questioning, unlike his request for counsel, does not raise the presumption that he is unable to proceed without a lawyer's advice."' 0 9 In response to the state's suggestion that Roberson's request for counsel was a limited one similar to the one made by the subject in Connecticut v. Barrett,"1 0 Justice Stevens stated that, "as a matter of law, the presumption raised by a subject's request for counsel-that he considers himself unable to deal with the pressures of custodial interrogation without legal assistance-does not disappear simply the "bright-line" rule while focusing on other issues. In Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (1984), the Court noted that "Edwards set forth a bright-line rule that all questions must cease" following an assertion of the right to counsel. Id. at 98. Similarly, the Court in Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638 (1984), mentioned that, "Edwards established a brightline rule to safeguard existing rights." Id. at 646. Finally, in Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983), the Court commented that Edwards had established, "in effect[,] a prophylactic rule designed to protect an accused in police custody from being badgered." Id. at 1044. Justice Stevens, by citing these cases seemed to be strongly emphasizing the importance the Court places on the clarity of interrogation rules. 102 Roberson, 108 S. Ct. at 2098.
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because the police have approached the subject, still in custody, still without counsel, about a separate investigation."" '1 Justice Stevens considered and quickly dismissed the state's attempts to factually distinguish Roberson from Edwards.'" 2 Responding to the state's suggestion that separate investigations necessarily preclude the threat of leaving a subject open to badgering, Justice Stevens observed that, "it is by no means clear, though, that police engaged in separate investigations will be any less eager than police involved in only one inquiry to question a suspect in custody." 1 3
The majority also rejected the idea that reading a subject a fresh set of warnings prior to the resumption of questioning would offset any feelings of coercion to which the subject might have fallen prey while in custody. 114 The Court concluded that the police violated Edwards when they questioned Roberson about the second crime, and affirmed the suppression order."1 5 B. THE DISSENT Justice Kennedy began the dissent by criticizing the majority for characterizing the state's petition as a request that the Court craft an exception to the Edwards rule."1 6 The dissent argued that the Edwards rule was the creation of the Court rather than a constitutional command, and that it therefore fell to the Court to justify its expansion." t7 Justice Kennedy then asserted that such a justification would prove difficult because the rule laid down by the Court in Roberson, barring further questioning concerning any investigation following a subject's assertion of his right to counsel, "is not necessary to protect the rights of suspects, and it will in many instances deprive our nationwide law enforcement network of a legitimate investigative technique." ' 1 8 Justice Kennedy further assailed the majority opinion for effecting an expansion of the Edwards rule to cover independent investigations when previous decisions applying that rule had involved single investigations exclusively. 
690
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The true focus in Edwards, Justice Kennedy suggested, "is whether the suspect knows and understands his rights and is willing to waive them, and whether the courts can be sure that coercion did not induce the waiver." 12 0 The dissent then considered the majority's fear that permitting further interrogation in separate investigations would lead to badgering, and concluded that because a subject has the right to terminate subsequent interrogations in the same manner as he terminates the first, the subject already enjoys sufficient protection from coercion. 12 1 According to Justice Kennedy, a subject who asserts his right to counsel in an initial interrogation, and sees that questioning ceases, will understand that he may invoke the same right in subsequent interrogations and expect the same result.1 22 The dissent argued that when, as in Edwards, the Court establishes a rule itself rather than drawing that rule directly from the Constitution, balance between competing interests becomes essential. 123 Justice Kennedy stated that allowing the authorities to question subjects in custody about separate investigations subsequent to a request for counsel might preserve the rights of suspects without inhibiting police procedure, thus achieving the requisite balance. 124 The dissent criticized the majority for allowing its focus on maintaining a bright-line rule to cause the Court to draw a line "far more restrictive than necessary to protect the interests at stake."' 12 5
Finally, Justice Kennedy disputed the majority's assumption that a request for counsel demonstrates a professed inability to deal with any questioning absent the presence of an attorney, rather than a desire for legal advice in a particular situation. 126 The dissent suginvolved interrogation subsequent to a request for counsel, but the subsequent interrogations were limited to the original cases. Id. 120 Roberson, 108 U.S. at 2102 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 121 Id. at 2102-03 (Kennedy,J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy argued that " [w] here the subsequent questioning is confined entirely to an independent investigation, there is little risk that the suspect will be badgered into submission." Id. at 2102 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 122 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy suggested that "[i]ndeed, the new warnings and explanations will reinforce his comprehension of a suspect's rights." Id. 
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW gested that a more realistic approach would involve informing the suspect of the second case and allowing the suspect to determine whether he wished to answer questions. 12 The dissent concluded that the Court should have focused not on expanding Edwards to establish a rigid rule on interrogation procedure, but should instead have adopted a more flexible rule enabling courts to analyze the particular circumstances of each case to determine whether a defendant had made a waiver of the right to counsel voluntarily. 131
V. ANALYSIS
In Arizona v. Roberson 3 2 the Court established a rule barring police from questioning a subject in custody on any matter, subsequent to the subject's request for counsel, until the subject has seen an attorney or initiated further contact with the authorities himself. 13 3 The Court based its holding on the desire to protect the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, as expressed in Miranda and its progeny.' 3 4 The Court reached the correct decision does not wish to talk about that investigation without counsel present, although that decision was made when the suspect was unaware of even the existence of a separate invesigation. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 1985) . Moulton concerned a confession obtained after the subject was arraigned and counsel appointed for him. The police elicited a confession by taping the subject's remarks to a conspirator. Id. at 163-167. The Court held the confession inadmissable because the subject had already asserted his right to counsel and the surreptitious taping therefore constituted illegal contact. Id. at 176-77. 130 Roberson, 108 S. Ct. at 2103-04 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy noted that:
Moulton and Mosley nevertheless reflected an understanding that the invocation of a criminal suspect's rights could be respected, and opportunities for unfair coercion restricted, without the establishment of a broad-brush rule by which the assertion of a right in one investigation is automatically applied to a separate and independent one. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) . 131 Id. at 2104 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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in Roberson, given the procedural error in that case, but in its zeal to secure the privilege against self-incrimination the Court imposed an unwarranted and unnecessary restriction on the authorities' ability to question suspects. Roberson represents a step in the wrong direction on interrogation regulation. The Court chose a case unrepresentative of proper police procedure and from it promulgated a rule which both ignores the Court's previous holding on the applicability of the assertion of Miranda rights to separate investigations, 1 3 5 and denigrates the ability of lower courts to decide the admissibility of evidence obtained through the legitimate investigative technique of interrogation.
Justice Stevens advanced three arguments in the majority opinion: first, that the state's petition to overturn the suppression order constituted a request that the Court craft an exception to the Edwards rule;' 3 6 second, that Roberson established a bright-line rule of interrogation procedure, thus satisfying a dictate of Miranda that interrogation rules should be unambiguous; 3 7 and third, that the Roberson rule provides safeguards necessary to protect the privilege against self-incrimination.1 3 8 Justice Kennedy, in the dissent, offered three counter-arguments: first, that the Court's ruling in Roberson effected an unjustified expansion of Edwards;' 3 9 second, that the primary concern in Edwards was that any waiver of rights should be made knowingly as well as voluntarily and that the Roberson expansion was therefore inappropriate; 40 
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state of mind of custodial subjects. 14 ' Neither the majority nor the dissent suggested a rule which would further the aim of Miranda: to provide a framework for interrogation which would accord proper respect to the custodial subject's fifth amendment rights without completely devaluing evidence obtained from interrogation. 42 In fact, the majority and the dissent ignored or misconstrued previous decisions by the Court which would have enabled the Court to establish a rule which would respect the privilege against self-incrimination without preventing legitimate police contact with custodial subjects.
In Michigan v. Mosley 14 3 the Court held that the authorities could approach custodial subjects on unrelated investigations following the assertion of the right to counsel, so long as the authorities "scrupulously honored" the subject's rights on each 147 Roberson, 108 S. Ct. at 2096. Justice Stevens noted that such an exception would apply to "cases in which the police want to interrogate a suspect about an offense that is unrelated to the subject of their initial interrogation." Id. 148 Id. at 2102 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy argued that, "the rule of Edwards is our rule, not a constitutional command; and it is our obligation to justify its expansion." Id. at 2101-02 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Miranda doctrine. Although Justice Stevens described Edwards as a "corollary"' 4 9 of Miranda, such language obscures the fact that the bars police from any contact with a subject subsequent to the subject's request for counsel; it complicates interrogation procedure though, in that it establishes contrary rules as to the applicability of the assertion of the right to silence, and the right to counsel, to separate investigations.' 59 Further, Roberson goes too far in its attempt to combat the coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogation by prohibiting police contact with the subject altogether. Justice Kennedy, in asserting that Roberson presents no issue as to a subject's intelligent waiver and therefore constitutes an inappropriate expansion of Edwards,' 6 0 erred in failing to see that the question of a subject's intelligent waiver was not the only concern of Edwards. Thus, the majority opinion and the dissent correctly identified two concerns of the Miranda decision, but erred in seeing their respective concern as solely determinative of the value of the Roberson decision. The majority opinion concluded that in order to combat the coercive nature of custodial interrogation, the police should be barred from any contact with a subject subsequent to the subject's assertion of his right to counsel; 16 1 the dissent suggested that in so concluding the majority in effect presumed to read the minds of custodial subjects. 162 Justice Stevens asserted that a subject's will might quickly be suborned if he were repeatedly asked to assert his fifth amendment rights as the authorities approached him on different issues. 163 Justice Kennedy offered a more realistic scenario, suggesting that if a subject asserted his rights in one case and observed that they were respected, he would understand that he might assert his rights in subsequent interrogations and expect the same result.'6 The dissent argued that police should be allowed to inform subjects 159 Mosley established that police could approach subjects on unrelated investigations
